Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups

Abstract Rebel groups that confront the government frequently become engaged in fierce and violent struggles with other groups. Why does a rebel group who is already fighting with the government become engaged in yet another struggle, thereby sacrificing scarce resources in the fight against other rebel groups? This article addresses this puzzle by providing the first global study on the determinants of interrebel violence. The authors argue that this violence should be understood as a means to secure material resources and political leverage that can help the group prevail in the conflict with the government. The quantitative analysis builds on new data on armed conflict between nonstate actors, 1989-2007. The results show that interrebel conflict is more likely when the rebel group fights in an area with drug cultivation, when the group is in control of territory beyond government reach, when the group is either militarily strong or weak in relation to other rebels, and where state authority is weak. Keywords civil war, interrebel violence, non-state conflict, rebel group Why do some civil conflicts see fierce and sustained fighting between groups on the nonstate side, whereas other conflicts do not? Armed conflicts between rebel organizations have been prevalent in, for example, the Myanmar, Afghan, Liberian, and Sudanese conflicts. These incidents are not idiosyncrasies

Pathways from research to sustainable development: insights from ten research projects in sustainability and resilience

Drawing on collective experience from ten collaborative research projects focused on the Global South, we identify three major challenges that impede the translation of research on sustainability and resilience into better-informed choices by individuals and policy-makers that in turn can support transformation to a sustainable future. The three challenges comprise: (i) converting knowledge produced during research projects into successful knowledge application; (ii) scaling up knowledge in time when research projects are short-term and potential impacts are long-term; and (iii) scaling up knowledge across space, from local research sites to larger-scale or even global impact. Some potential pathways for funding agencies to overcome these challenges include providing targeted prolonged funding for dissemination and outreach, and facilitating collaboration and coordination across different sites, research teams, and partner organizations. By systematically documenting these challenges, we hope to pave the way for further innovations in the research cycle

Sins of Omission and Commission : The Quality of Government and Civil Conflict

Is the risk of civil conflict related to the quality of government? This dissertation contributes to the quantitative research on this topic. First, it provides a more nuanced account of the role of the government in influencing the risk of civil conflict. In doing so, the dissertation bridges a gap between the quantitative literature, which primarily focuses on types of regimes, and the qualitative literature, which emphasizes variations in how political authority is exercised within these institutions. Second, the dissertation introduces novel measures of the quality of government, and tests their association with civil peace across countries, over time. The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and four separate essays. Essay I examines the risk of conflict across different types of authoritarian regimes. The statistical results suggest that single-party regimes have a lower risk of civil conflict than military and multi-party authoritarian regimes. The finding is attributed to the high capacity for coercion and co-optation within single-party institutions. Essay II studies whether cross-national variations in the occurrence of civil conflict are due to differences in the quality of government. The essay finds that governments that are not able to carry through such basic governing tasks as protecting property rights and providing public goods, render themselves vulnerable to civil conflict. The focus of Essay III is on patronage politics, meaning that rulers rely on the distribution of private goods to retain the support necessary to stay in power. The statistical results suggest that patronage politics per se increase the risk of conflict. The conflict-inducing effect is mediated by large oil-wealth, however, because the government can use the wealth strategically to buy off opposition. Essay IV argues that patronage politics can also lead to violent conflict between groups. The results from a statistical analysis, based on unique sub-national data on inter-group conflict in Nigeria, are consistent with this argument. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation suggest that both the form and degree of government have a significant influence on the risk of civil conflict

Sins of Omission and Commission : The Quality of Government and Civil Conflict

Is the risk of civil conflict related to the quality of government? This dissertation contributes to the quantitative research on this topic. First, it provides a more nuanced account of the role of the government in influencing the risk of civil conflict. In doing so, the dissertation bridges a gap between the quantitative literature, which primarily focuses on types of regimes, and the qualitative literature, which emphasizes variations in how political authority is exercised within these institutions. Second, the dissertation introduces novel measures of the quality of government, and tests their association with civil peace across countries, over time. The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and four separate essays. Essay I examines the risk of conflict across different types of authoritarian regimes. The statistical results suggest that single-party regimes have a lower risk of civil conflict than military and multi-party authoritarian regimes. The finding is attributed to the high capacity for coercion and co-optation within single-party institutions. Essay II studies whether cross-national variations in the occurrence of civil conflict are due to differences in the quality of government. The essay finds that governments that are not able to carry through such basic governing tasks as protecting property rights and providing public goods, render themselves vulnerable to civil conflict. The focus of Essay III is on patronage politics, meaning that rulers rely on the distribution of private goods to retain the support necessary to stay in power. The statistical results suggest that patronage politics per se increase the risk of conflict. The conflict-inducing effect is mediated by large oil-wealth, however, because the government can use the wealth strategically to buy off opposition. Essay IV argues that patronage politics can also lead to violent conflict between groups. The results from a statistical analysis, based on unique sub-national data on inter-group conflict in Nigeria, are consistent with this argument. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation suggest that both the form and degree of government have a significant influence on the risk of civil conflict

Socioeconomic Inequality and Communal Conflict: A Disaggregated Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008

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Sins of Omission and Commission : The Quality of Government and Civil Conflict

Is the risk of civil conflict related to the quality of government? This dissertation contributes to the quantitative research on this topic. First, it provides a more nuanced account of the role of the government in influencing the risk of civil conflict. In doing so, the dissertation bridges a gap between the quantitative literature, which primarily focuses on types of regimes, and the qualitative literature, which emphasizes variations in how political authority is exercised within these institutions. Second, the dissertation introduces novel measures of the quality of government, and tests their association with civil peace across countries, over time. The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and four separate essays. Essay I examines the risk of conflict across different types of authoritarian regimes. The statistical results suggest that single-party regimes have a lower risk of civil conflict than military and multi-party authoritarian regimes. The finding is attributed to the high capacity for coercion and co-optation within single-party institutions. Essay II studies whether cross-national variations in the occurrence of civil conflict are due to differences in the quality of government. The essay finds that governments that are not able to carry through such basic governing tasks as protecting property rights and providing public goods, render themselves vulnerable to civil conflict. The focus of Essay III is on patronage politics, meaning that rulers rely on the distribution of private goods to retain the support necessary to stay in power. The statistical results suggest that patronage politics per se increase the risk of conflict. The conflict-inducing effect is mediated by large oil-wealth, however, because the government can use the wealth strategically to buy off opposition. Essay IV argues that patronage politics can also lead to violent conflict between groups. The results from a statistical analysis, based on unique sub-national data on inter-group conflict in Nigeria, are consistent with this argument. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation suggest that both the form and degree of government have a significant influence on the risk of civil conflict

Generals, Dictators, and Kings

Recent years have seen a surge of literature examining how political institutions influence the risk of civil conflict. A comparatively neglected aspect of this debate has been the heterogeneous impact of different forms of authoritarianism. In this article, I theoretically and empirically unpack the authoritarian regime category. I argue that authoritarian regimes differ both in their capacity to forcefully control opposition and in their ability to co-opt their rivals through offers of power positions and rents. Authoritarian regimes thus exhibit predictable differences in their ability to avoid organized violent challenges to their authority. I examine the association between four types of authoritarian regimes—military, monarchy, single-party, and multi-party electoral autocracies—and the onset of civil conflict from 1973 to 2004. I find that military regimes and multi-party electoral autocracies run a higher risk of armed conflict than single-party authoritarian regimes, which on the other hand seem to have an institutional set-up that makes them particularly resilient to armed challenges to their authority. These findings suggest that the emerging view, that political institutions are not a significant determinant of civil conflict, results from treating a heterogeneous set of authoritarian regimes as homogenous.authoritarian regimes; autocracy; civil conflict; civil war; democratic civil peace; political institutions; regime type

Britisk tilbaketrekning - et scenario for fred? : en spillteoretisk analyse av den irske republikanske bevegelsens trusler mot Storbritannia

Etter flere år med sporadisk oppoisisjon mot det politiske systemet blusset konflikten om Nord-Irlands territoriale status opp igjen mot slutten av 1960-tallet. Situasjonen var så spent at Storbritannia måtte sette inn styrker for å stabilisere situasjonen. Etter et mislykket fredsinitiativ i 1973 lanserte den republikanske bevegelsen, bestående av Sinn Féin og IRA, sin Long War strategi mot Storbritannia. Denne gikk ut på å føre en langvarig utmattelseskrig mot britiske interesser, samtididg som Sinn Féin skulle drive politisk propaganda. I 1981 ble denne strategien justert i form av økt vektlegging av Sinn Féins rolle i kampen for et forent Irland. Den nye Ballot box & Armalite strategien åpnet nemlig for at SF kunne ta ibruk mandatene partiet vant i lokale valg. I 1986 ble strategien ytterligerer justert i form av en reell sidestilling av Sinn Féins og IRAs rolle i kampen mot Storbritannia. Dette ble mulig da bevegelsen også tillot sine medlemmer å ta ibruk mandater SF vant i valget til den irske nasjonalforsamlingen (Dáil). 1986-vedtaket fikk en vesentlig betydning for utviklingen i den republikankse bevegelsen og i Nord-Irland generelt. Med et videre politisk mandat innledet SF politiske samtaler med det største nasjonalistiske partiet, SDLP, og sammen redegjorde disse for sine synspunkter for den britiske og den irske regjeringen. Disse samtalene, sammen med SFs frykt for politisk isolasjon, bevegelsens økte forståelse over svakthetene ved tidligere strategier, og en fastlåst militær situasjon førte til at IRA i 1994 erklærte en ensidig våpenhvile. Denne oppgaven tar for seg den republikanske bevegelsens strategiske tilnærming til Nord-Irland konflikten under Ballot box & Armalite-strategien, fra 1981-1994, og retter kritiske spørsmål til hva bevegelsen oppnådde ved bruk av trusler og militære aksjoner mot Storbritannia. Mer spesifikt foretas en trusselanalyse basert på Jon Hovis (1998) teoretiske betingelser for effektive trusler. Oppgaven søker å sannsynliggjøre at Hovis betingelser om klarhet og troverdighet var oppfylt, men at de tre resterende betingelsene om relevans, alvorlighet og fullstendighet hadde fundamentale svakheter heftet ved seg